Ali Sabry Must Answer: What Was Really Agreed Behind Sri Lanka’s 2022 IMF Bailout?
Sri Lankan taxpayers deserve full transparency over the negotiations, legal appointments and debt-restructuring arrangements that shaped the country’s IMF rescue programme. Former Finance Minister Ali Sabry cannot simply claim that the poor were protected without disclosing what was agreed behind closed doors.
Sri Lanka’s economic crisis in 2022 was one of the most challenging periods in the country’s modern history. With foreign currency reserves depleted, essential imports becoming increasingly difficult to finance and the country facing an unprecedented sovereign debt crisis, the government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a rescue programme.
At the centre of these negotiations was Ali Sabry, who served as Finance Minister during the critical period under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and subsequently returned to the position under President Ranil Wickremesinghe.
Now, several important questions are emerging about the negotiations he conducted, the legal arrangements made on behalf of the Sri Lankan government and the terms under which the country's external debt was restructured.
These are not merely political questions. They concern billions of dollars in public liabilities and the financial future of generations of Sri Lankan taxpayers.
What exactly did Ali Sabry agree to on behalf of the Sri Lankan people?
The IMF rescue programme: What was agreed behind closed doors?
When Ali Sabry discusses the IMF programme, he has emphasised that the interests of poorer sections of society were protected and that social safety nets were maintained.
But such assurances are not sufficient.
Sri Lankan taxpayers deserve to see the actual commitments made to the IMF. What conditions were accepted? What fiscal adjustments were agreed? What were the commitments concerning taxation, public expenditure, state-owned enterprises and debt repayment?
More importantly, what specific protections were negotiated for low-income families?
There is a fundamental distinction between saying that the poor were protected and demonstrating, through documented agreements, how their interests were protected.
Ali Sabry is a lawyer by profession. He understands the importance of precise language, contractual obligations and the interpretation of legal provisions. He also understands that carefully selected words can create a particular impression without necessarily explaining the full substance of an agreement.
Therefore, the public deserves more than carefully worded political explanations.
They deserve the documents.
The London-based legal appointment: Who selected the firm and at what cost?
Another important area requiring transparency concerns the appointment of a London-based legal firm to assist Sri Lanka with its sovereign debt restructuring and negotiations with international creditors.
The selection of international legal advisers was a significant decision. These firms were entrusted with advising a financially distressed country negotiating with powerful international creditors.
Who initiated the selection process?
Was the appointment made through a competitive procurement process? Were alternative legal firms considered? What were the terms of reference? Who evaluated the proposals and ultimately approved the appointment?
And, critically, how much did the Sri Lankan taxpayer pay?
The government was negotiating from an extremely vulnerable financial position. Every dollar spent on international legal representation and financial advisory services should therefore have been subject to proper scrutiny.
The public should be entitled to know the firm's contractual obligations, its fees, the scope of its mandate and whether any additional payments or success-related arrangements were included.
This is not an argument against employing international legal expertise. Sri Lanka needed professional assistance during a complicated sovereign debt restructuring.
It is an argument for transparency when public money is being spent.
Did every creditor receive equal treatment?
Perhaps the most consequential issue concerns the structure of Sri Lanka's debt restructuring.
Debt restructuring is not simply an exercise in reducing the amount owed. It involves complex negotiations over repayment schedules, interest rates, maturity extensions, financial instruments and the distribution of losses among different categories of creditors.
The central question is whether Sri Lanka secured the fairest possible arrangement for its taxpayers.
Were all creditors treated according to consistent and transparent principles? Were some countries or creditor groups required to accept significantly greater financial adjustments than others?
What role did bilateral negotiations play in determining the final restructuring framework?
There are also questions about the treatment of India's financial exposure compared with that of other creditors.
India was an important financial partner during Sri Lanka's economic crisis, providing substantial emergency assistance. Its position in the subsequent debt restructuring deserves to be understood alongside the arrangements reached with other bilateral creditors.
Did India receive different repayment arrangements? If so, what justified those arrangements? Were comparable adjustments demanded from other creditors?
These are legitimate questions about the consistency and fairness of the restructuring process. They should be answered through published agreements and financial disclosures rather than political speculation.
There should be no assumption that any particular country received preferential treatment or that another was unfairly disadvantaged without examining the actual agreements.
But Ali Sabry, as the minister responsible during a crucial stage of the process, should be able to explain the decisions.
Was Ranil Wickremesinghe's administration responsible for the negotiating strategy?
Another question concerns the political decision-making behind the IMF programme.
Ali Sabry did not operate in a political vacuum. He served under President Ranil Wickremesinghe during a period when Sri Lanka was desperately seeking international financial assistance and attempting to restore confidence among creditors.
To what extent did the President's office determine the negotiating strategy?
Which decisions were made by the Finance Ministry, which were taken by the President and which were recommended by international advisers?
Did Ali Sabry independently approve the restructuring arrangements, or was he implementing a broader political and economic strategy determined by the Wickremesinghe administration?
If he believed that particular terms were unfavourable to Sri Lanka, did he raise objections? Were alternative proposals considered?
The public should not have to rely on political personalities to reconstruct what happened during negotiations that involved the country's economic sovereignty.
There should be an identifiable documentary record of the decisions, recommendations and approvals.
The questions Ali Sabry must answer
Sri Lanka has moved beyond the immediate emergency of 2022. The country is now confronting the longer-term consequences of the economic decisions taken during that period.
That makes transparency even more important.
Ali Sabry should publicly address the following questions:
What were the complete terms and conditions agreed with the IMF during the initial negotiations in 2022?
What specific commitments were made concerning taxation, public expenditure and social protection for low-income families?
Who selected the London-based legal firm responsible for assisting with sovereign debt restructuring?
How much was paid to the legal firm and other international financial advisers, including any additional contractual fees?
What were the firm's complete terms of reference and contractual responsibilities?
What was the final financial impact of the restructuring on each category of creditor?
Were the arrangements with India materially different from those reached with other bilateral creditors, and what were the reasons?
Were any individuals, political representatives or external advisers instrumental in securing particular restructuring arrangements?
Did the Finance Ministry consider alternative restructuring proposals that might have delivered better outcomes for Sri Lankan taxpayers?
Will Ali Sabry publish the relevant agreements, negotiation records and official correspondence, subject to legitimate confidentiality and legal restrictions?
Accountability is not political revenge
The purpose of raising these questions should not be to conduct a political witch-hunt against a former minister.
Nor should it undermine Sri Lanka's relationship with the IMF or its international creditors.
Sri Lanka needed an IMF programme. It needed professional legal advice. It needed an agreement with creditors to restore financial stability.
But necessity does not eliminate accountability.
When a government negotiates billions of dollars in public debt, the people have a legitimate right to understand the decisions made on their behalf.
Ali Sabry repeatedly speaks about protecting the poor under the IMF programme. If that protection was genuinely secured, he should have no difficulty explaining the specific provisions, commitments and financial arrangements that delivered it.
The question is not whether Sri Lanka needed an IMF rescue programme. The question is whether Sri Lanka negotiated the best possible deal under the circumstances.
And if the arrangements were fair, transparent and beneficial to the country, why should taxpayers be denied a comprehensive explanation?
Sri Lanka's debt belongs to its people. The responsibility for negotiating it belongs to those entrusted with public office. Ali Sabry must now explain what was agreed, who benefited, what it cost and whether the interests of Sri Lankan taxpayers were genuinely protected.
