Gotabaya’s Latest Court Testimony Raises Questions Over His Claimed Role in the War
Former President and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s testimony in the ongoing Lalith–Kugan case has reopened questions about the precise role he played in Sri Lanka’s military campaign against the LTTE—and about how that role was subsequently presented to the public.
During evidence given remotely to court, Rajapaksa reportedly rejected allegations that he personally participated in military operations. He said that, as Defence Secretary, his responsibility was to communicate government policy to the relevant institutions and that he was not directly involved in ground operations or in issuing instructions concerning alleged abductions and disappearances.
That testimony raises an important historical question: where exactly did the Defence Secretary's responsibility end, and where did military operational decision-making begin?
From “war hero” to “coordinator”?
Rajapaksa's political image during the 2019 presidential election was closely associated with the military victory over the LTTE. Contemporary reporting described how many supporters viewed him as a “war hero” who had helped lead the government to victory.
But the current court testimony appears to place greater emphasis on a different description of his wartime role: a civilian Defence Secretary responsible for coordination rather than direct battlefield command.
That distinction is significant.
There is, of course, no contradiction in principle between coordinating national defence policy and not personally commanding troops in the field. The Defence Secretary and the Army Commander held different institutional responsibilities.
Indeed, historical accounts describe Rajapaksa as playing an important coordinating role between the Army, Navy and Air Force, while Sarath Fonseka was responsible for tactical planning within the Army.
The question therefore is not simply whether Gotabaya Rajapaksa was “involved” or “not involved.” The more precise question is what decisions did he actually make, what authority did he exercise, and what did he claim publicly about that authority?
Sarath Fonseka's role
Former Army Commander Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka has long maintained that the Army's battlefield operations were conducted under his command.
Rajapaksa himself publicly praised Fonseka's role during the war. In remarks reported at the time, Rajapaksa described Fonseka as responsible for tactical planning for Army operations and said that his personal supervision of the battlefield was a decisive factor in the campaign.
The United Nations Secretary-General's Panel of Experts also described the wartime command structure: Mahinda Rajapaksa was President and Minister of Defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa was Defence Secretary, and Sarath Fonseka was Army Commander.
Consequently, any attempt to establish individual responsibility for particular military decisions must distinguish between political authority, Defence Ministry administration, inter-service coordination and operational military command.
What does this mean for the 2019 election narrative?
This is where the political debate becomes particularly important.
If Gotabaya Rajapaksa's current evidence is that he was not directly involved in military operations, that evidence can reasonably be compared with the public narrative surrounding his wartime record during the 2019 presidential campaign.
But it would be premature to conclude from the present testimony alone that he “lied” during the election campaign or that criminal or other legal proceedings automatically follow.
Whether a particular campaign statement was false, materially misleading or legally actionable would depend on the exact words used, their context, the applicable election law, the evidence concerning what he actually did, and the limitation or procedural rules governing any proposed legal action.
The court testimony may nevertheless provide material for journalists, historians and lawyers to examine whether different descriptions of Rajapaksa's wartime role are consistent.
The MIG and other defence controversies
The same scrutiny may also revive questions surrounding major defence procurement controversies during Rajapaksa's tenure as Defence Secretary.
Rajapaksa previously defended his role in the controversial MiG aircraft procurement, saying that the Air Force had requested the aircraft and that procurement involved financial evaluations, tender boards and negotiation committees rather than being a “one man operation.”
That statement is relevant because it demonstrates the importance of distinguishing ministerial/administrative responsibility from personal responsibility for an individual transaction. Allegations concerning procurement must similarly be established through documentary and judicial evidence rather than assumed from the fact that Rajapaksa was Defence Secretary.
The question now before the public
The Lalith–Kugan proceedings therefore raise a broader historical question:
Was Gotabaya Rajapaksa the operational decision-maker portrayed in parts of the political narrative surrounding the war, or was he principally the Defence Secretary who coordinated government policy and the three armed services while battlefield decisions remained with commanders such as Sarath Fonseka?
The answer should ultimately come from contemporaneous documents, official records, testimony and judicial findings—not political slogans.
What makes the present testimony significant is that Rajapaksa himself has now placed his own description of his wartime responsibilities before a court. That evidence can be compared with his previous public statements and with the accounts given by former military commanders.
The question is no longer simply who deserves credit for the military victory. The more fundamental question is: who made which decisions, under what authority, and what did the public actually get told about it?